Today, I represented YOUNGO in Climate Finance talks over the new report released last Friday. This Monday's in-person meeting between 4 NGO representatives and the AGF secretariat was interesting for me. Below are the notes...I will write more soon.
After an open call for feedback, questions, talking points and comments. We received a few responses. IF you haven't had a chance to engage in the feedback process...it is not to late Leela and Kyle will be holding a conference call to discuss the finalised AGF report.
As the report is finalised, it cannot be changed. It is external to the UN FCCC process. The purpose of the meetings appear to be mainly to answer our questions and see our reactions in order (it appears to me) to build ownership within civil society. The report is advisory in nature and therefore requires political will to be implemented. A copy has been circulated to every Government by the UN Secretary General on the 5th November. Please be careful when you are commenting to use the official (rather than the leaked copy) as the leaked copy includes less global south materials, less information, is not legitimate and has fewer sections (E.g no executive summary) etc.
At the meeting we discussed points raised by youth who contacted me (see section below), points raised by CAN, individual from Columbia and WEDO. We discussed the G20 level and how it may tie in. They say that not officially but as PM Meles Zenawi was invited...it is possible that he is likely to refer to it.
To summarize:
AGF report is advisory in nature. Therefore implementation, use, etc depends on individual member states and all have received a copy.
The AGF's role is concluded with this report. Its function was to create a financial report outlining how the $100billion target could be feasibly achieved.
Report is finalised (as we know and can't be changed). However, you can look at the work flows (that were also published) to see if some of your basic questions are answered there.
When asked how they would like the report to be used...they said that they would like to see implementation. They admitted the report is conservative but it can be modified and expanded upon. They referenced policy or political decisions that had already been instituted whenever possible to build support.
DISCLAIMER: The questions or comments (occasionally worded differently to combine different individuals comments on same topic) asked on behalf of YOUNGO (and due to feedback) plus the answers are below (in no particular order).
After an open call for feedback, questions, talking points and comments. We received a few responses. IF you haven't had a chance to engage in the feedback process...it is not to late Leela and Kyle will be holding a conference call to discuss the finalised AGF report.
As the report is finalised, it cannot be changed. It is external to the UN FCCC process. The purpose of the meetings appear to be mainly to answer our questions and see our reactions in order (it appears to me) to build ownership within civil society. The report is advisory in nature and therefore requires political will to be implemented. A copy has been circulated to every Government by the UN Secretary General on the 5th November. Please be careful when you are commenting to use the official (rather than the leaked copy) as the leaked copy includes less global south materials, less information, is not legitimate and has fewer sections (E.g no executive summary) etc.
At the meeting we discussed points raised by youth who contacted me (see section below), points raised by CAN, individual from Columbia and WEDO. We discussed the G20 level and how it may tie in. They say that not officially but as PM Meles Zenawi was invited...it is possible that he is likely to refer to it.
To summarize:
AGF report is advisory in nature. Therefore implementation, use, etc depends on individual member states and all have received a copy.
The AGF's role is concluded with this report. Its function was to create a financial report outlining how the $100billion target could be feasibly achieved.
Report is finalised (as we know and can't be changed). However, you can look at the work flows (that were also published) to see if some of your basic questions are answered there.
When asked how they would like the report to be used...they said that they would like to see implementation. They admitted the report is conservative but it can be modified and expanded upon. They referenced policy or political decisions that had already been instituted whenever possible to build support.
DISCLAIMER: The questions or comments (occasionally worded differently to combine different individuals comments on same topic) asked on behalf of YOUNGO (and due to feedback) plus the answers are below (in no particular order).
Anything that is in bold was asked / included and answers are in Italics.I will also be getting better notes from another participant because I didn't have much time to write...so more comprehensive ones will be available ASAP. Anything that point you may have sent me that is not below was not included. I am sorry but there was a limited amount of time and I tried to ask interlinked questions and recurring (in the youth feedback) questions when possible to ensure that most views were expressed.
--------------------------------------------
Florent Baarsch ( fromTuvalu) points:
Q 1) The position of the AGF concerning double counting is not really clear. At the §15, it's written that there were 2 different views within the group: offset should count towards the $100bn / offset should not count towards the goal. And this is a major point of the report, if the parties (developed countries) decide to count offset towards the goal, it means that the $8.2bn of the CDM (for 2008 or 9) will be taken into account in the $100bn goal. And it would be a major problem considering the fact that CDM project are rarely implemented for adaptation and just for more or less fake compensations... to add to this point...Clean Development Mechanisms when implemented...are rarely financially beneficial (except for a few cases in the Pacific) that Clean Development Mechanisms
There was no real answer to this question. They avoided it and talked around it and then their reply was that later in the report they mention implications of each view. And that CDMs were barely touched on in any great detail.
2- At the §59, there is a big and really important discussion concerning the measurement of the flows. Basically, there are 3 possibilities: net, gross, and both. And considering the "methodological difficulties", one of the view supports the gross measurement. Then if they decide to keep the "gross", reaching the $100bn is going to be quite easy knowing that the net is always superior to the gross. But it's also true that it's really difficult to assess, but difficulties should not be a reason not to assess.
This question was also asked by CAN. The reply was that it is a political decision. They are not a decision making / implementing body. They just offer advice and alternatives.
3- additionality. At the §74, there is for the 1st time in an official UN document an attempt at defining additionality. The § is not really exciting, but the last sentence is: "There are also other interpretations, however, such as taking the view that the US$100 billion target should be measured in a way that would be additional to a 2020 official development assistance (ODA) reference case." And this is great... because it's written!
6- Considering carbon pricing and the comment made by Leela, there are not plan B, or C. At the moment, we don't know how they are going to define the price of the ton of CO2. Is the price of the tax going to follow the price of the ton of carbon on the international markets or is it going to be determined by the states themselves? The solution 2 is the safest one, but the solution 1 would be preferred by the private sector because they know that they can have a strong influence on a weak market. I have not read anything about that in the report, if someone did has, please comment!
Everything is up to member states governments due to the fact that this is just an advisory report. It is up to states to decide if they will consider it / anything in it for inclusion in the UNFCCC negotiation text / in general.
------------------------------
Susi Hammel's (from Germany)
Negative
1. The main emphasis on private finance options, downplaying the role that public finance can and must play in helping developing countries deal with climate change. The AGF is undercutting its own mission by underestimating the revenue generated by feasible and popular sources of public finance (e.g. the financial transaction tax).
They said that civil society has suggested making a portfolio, that was not their aim and they didn't do it. They provide options. That was their mandate. e.g should ODA /not? is it possible? etc. Rather than....this is what needs to be done.
2.The reliance on carbon markets: these are not a valid source of finance for mitigation and adaptation, treating carbon markets as a source of new and additional finance creates a new loophole (double counting) for developed countries, AGF recommendations are unfortunately based on unduly optimistic econometric projections and a blind faith in the capacity of highly volatile and unreliable carbon price signals to induce long-term investments in low carbon energy production and manufacturing.
3. the $100 billion pledge contained in the Accord falls far short of all reasonable estimates of financing required by 2020 (e.g. impacts of climate-related extreme weather events in Pakistan in 2010 alone now approach $50 billion). $100 billion is an arbitrary, political figure that is based neither on need nor on equity.
Positive
1. The AGF acknowledges that meeting the needs of developing countries will take a ‘systemic approach’ to financing climate adaptation and mitigation.
2. The AGF report shows that there are numerous viable options to generate public finance for climate change. Developed countries have no excuse for inaction. The options are there. They must work through the UNFCCC to come to agreement on a combination of public sources to generate the desperately needed resources to help developing countries confront climate change.
3. Options like a financial transaction tax meet the mark: stabilizing the economy by curbing dangerous speculation and raising hundreds of billions of dollars each year for global public goods like combating climate change.
----------------------------------------
Leela Raina (from india)
1. The first and foremost thing to be asked is that the AGF has respected the finance part of 'climate finance' but how have they addressed the 'climate' part?Is it by giving solutions that create the very same environmental problems? How does the AGF justify the Climate part of climate finance?
2. . We appreciate page no 7 The Advisory Group found that raising US$100 billion per year is challenging but feasible. Now is the time to take decisions.that the agf has asked for urgency in taking decisions.
5.we appreciate that three windows for the carbon prices have been given but if the carbon prices fail to maintain there impetus, is there a plan B ? plan C? or alternative?
6. Most imp point - If the AGF has given Outreach so much importance then tell them to enlist 5 inputs from the civil society they have incorporated. In the past that I have been involved with , participation is useless unless someone acts on inputs! You can refer to page no 10 para 18 Outreach was an important element of the work of the Advisory Group, which consulted widely among numerous stakeholders.
1. Work flow being published.
2. Re wording of certain sections took Civil Societies wording suggestions.
3. The disclaimer at the top of the work flow published notes.
4. Did not include request for fixed portfolio as that is not their mandate. They were tasked with finding financial options to raise $100 billion.
---------------------------------------------------
Kjell Kühne's (Germany) points:-
"the climate side of climate finance". We need to fix a huge problem, not find a way to raise and spend 100 bn $ which are a sum way too small.
1. I find the reference for a 25$ carbon price not sufficient. The task at hand is the complete decarbonization of the global economy. When looking at mitigation cost studies, there is a lot of mitigation to be done above a cost of 25$. Unless there are co-benefits discovered and pursued together with mitigation, all that mitiation potential would most likely be postponed to after 2020!
Regarding mitigation....mitigation commitments drive negotiations and will change.
2. And ++ for asking what feedback from stakeholders they really integrated. If they have us participate just for the photo then let's go talk to the media and call the bluff.
This meeting was a closed one. There was no press.
-------------------------------------------------------
NOTES
1) Will you be doing outreach with IMO? Will you be linking with theNOTES
expert group report on GHG? There is a difference in numbers between
the two reports.
2) How do you envisage outreach?
3) Have you had any feedback about the report from countries already?
The Pre-COP in Mexico city finished Friday afternoon, and the report launched on Friday morning – so there was not really time for countries to give feedback. There was a lot of attention and expectation about how the report can be used. Regarding outreach, the report is now in the public domain. The way each country will use it depends on their positions. There is outreach to IMO in the sense that the report contains an
indication that further work is needed and transport is one of them.
The AGF does not prejudge any discussions that need to happen in proper fora – IMO or ICAO parties will have to look into this. Differences in numbers are based on differences in assumptions. We are looking at 2020. AGF workstream papers show the assumptions and calculations for the report. IMO made their own. IMO has been fully informed. UN agencies informed IMO and IMO provided feedback. But drafts were not shared. Expert group of IMO has not seen the report before now. They will react in their own way in their own fora, but not directly back to the AGF because the work of the AGF is finished. There was no formal submission to the expert group. The SG submits to governments – sent copy to all missions, to heads of state and governments – they are members of IMO – they can bring the information into the IMO process.
The report is positive in that it compiles info in a condensed way for UNFCCC – listing what IMO does is useful.
Numbers looked a bit conservative. I was a bit surprised about the allocation of 25-50% for climate. In other IMO reports the share allocated to revenues is a bit bigger. For the price of carbon – you could imagine some higher prices. It’s 15 euros today for ETS. On economics – the options listed for parameters that would allow a deal
to be struck in maritime are interesting. It was well condensed.
The report is an amazing contribution to the finance discussion – really interesting information for Cancun. Glad to see inclusion of financing from carbon markets.
1) What’s going to happen to the AGF now?
2) On Gross vs. net – what is the potential for engagement going
forward?
For discussions about accounting we might have a role to play.
As the SG said in the press conference, the work of AGF is concluded. There is no intention or plan of continuation of this work. The output is now with governments and can be used in Cancun for the
negotiations and other processes as well. But the work of the AGF is over. I believe numbers and methodology are well explained. The report shows governments that they can make it to the $100 billion target but it’s up to them. The options are there. The carbon price is a medium price. We have a high end also. We are looking 2020 scenarios – maybe it is a bit low on the price, but maybe it is correct.
On the methodology side what would you expect?
We could contribute to developing methodologies for accounting for finance. For market flows the intermarginal rents approach is complicated and challenging and will improve as its used in the private sector over the coming years.
Can the work of the AGF inform that?
No. Parties may see this type of exercise useful and further work is needed and they can task someone to do that – either the UNFCCC secretariat or a group established under the COP. The institutional questions are for governments to decide. The information can be used to feed into different assumptions. You talked about gross and net – the group didn’t take a decision about which type of metrics to use. This requires political decision.
There is a need now for political decisions to be taken. This may require further refinement and the group was not in a position to do so.
If you look at gross rather than net, you achieve goal quicker. We did like the report and would like for it to contribute to the negotiations. We liked that there are different viable options, and that it acknowledges that political will is necessary.
The press conference emphasized the importance of building consensus among civil society – how do you envision this?
The AGF doesn’t exist anymore. They were tasked with a specific task and they delivered it. Of course the members are well known and you will read about their views in the news. They have done it already and will continue. The Prime Ministers are interested in having positive contact from civil society in order to move climate finance agenda forward. There will not be an internationally coordinated event where the AGF will meet civil society but you could have a panel where some of them are sitting and perhaps we will organize this ourselves. I would like to hear your views and feedback as well.
Procedurally how does the SG intend to introduce the report to the COP?
The formal transmittal of report to governments is the official step of passing the report forward. Every country has the possibility of making the report available to UNFCCC in a formal way. Some others can say the report is publicly available so anyone can use it. There is a note already in the LCA text. At the moment, on the SG side, the feeling is his task is done. UNFCCC is a government driven process and it’s up to the governments now.
Did any country on the panel indicate they were interested in submitting it as a formal report into UNFCCC?
No, the main time pressure was to get the report done.
Between the leaked version and the final, there was some change in the numbers. With some of the numbers you were quite detailed for ways to get to a consensus. What is the story line behind the changes? Was there a negotiation process? Was it a way to create flexibility?
The workstreams were subgroups. When the report was being developed, the focus was not so much on numbers but how to bring pieces together. Then in Addis, people started to look into consistency. Then an approach was applied to all different workstreams.
Is a $25 carbon price enough? Most mitigation cost studies put the price higher. Do you not fear that mitigation will be postponed until after 2020?
Giving a price to carbon is a tough challenge, especially looking to the future. It was done on a pure economic basis that if you have this price you can get to this 100 billion goal.
In the mid price scenario you have taken advantageous assumptions about global agreement. Cap and trade you are assuming that people will take the high end. I’m not sure that’s the world we will be living in. How was it that we ended up with that?
It was a way of putting pressure on the key actors. They Kyoto commitment gave some urgency to governments to act. This has been achieved to give an idea of what can be done if there is political will.
One narrative of the report is that mitigation commitments also drive carbon price. The finance aspect is not fully isolated from how the overall negations will be developing further. The pressure is there on developed countries.
Governance does show up in part of the workstream studies. For bunkers there could be national or centralized fund. A centralized fund would be efficient and politically useful. What’s your feeling about how the AGF discussions have informed some discussions about governance structures?
They stayed away from that discussion – would prolong the process. In parts of the text there are some hints of ideas about that but there is no conclusion about governance.
Discussions of green fund in UNFCCC hinge on how it’s used. Do you see the AGF discussion informing this?
Yes. For this it’s read between the lines. You can read it to your advantage or disadvantage depending on who you are.
Do you think it’s a legitimate criticism that NGOs see a lack of focus on public financing?
The AGF TOR defined that the mandate of the group was to look at financing that could be mobilized for transfer from developed to developing countries. We had several meetings with NGOs where they said in order for this report to have legitimacy, there must be a portfolio that shows that 100bn can be mobilized through public sources. There are no portfolios, there are options. But there is a possibility to make a portfolio of 100 billion from public sources. It’s not explicitly stated this way but it doesn’t mean it can’t be done with what this report contains. It’s up to governments. But it’s quite remarkable that the report shows 100bn public can be mobilized.
How would you like the AGF to be used? Where is its best added value?
It’s important that the work is acknowledged in UNFCCC process and that someone says it is a useful input for the deliberations on long- term finance. Elements of the text can be used in terms of determining future steps. We have watched how things have developed over the months and of course we would like to see implementation but the formal process is very important. It has to be recognized. It allows governments to make decisions about what they prefer. It’s a lobbying instrument. NGOs can lobby for certain things over others. On financing in general – something really only takes off when there is a pilot project or when a couple of countries step forward to take something to the next level. So this would be something to look into. We need longer to ensure international cooperation on options but some options can be taken domestically. Some options have already been pledged. Fossil fuel subsidies have already been promised in the G20, but then you have to look at to what extent it has been taken up.
Will the AGF be advising countries who are trying to assemble portfolios?
No.
G20 is about to meet. Will there be tie in as far as subsidies?
PM Meles is invited. He will probably refer to the AGF. SG will be there and will refer to it in his remarks. Last G20 mentioned AGF and so it follows they will talk about the report now.
The range presented in the report for fuel subsidies is 3-8 billion. That number seems to come straight from G20. Subsidies are a nightmare in terms of accounting but the number is gigantic globally – around 550 billion. Beyond what has been promised in G20, what has been done on determining what can be mobilized beyond G20?
The range of 3-8 billion is a reference to a political decision that has been already taken. These things can be modified or can be expanded.
So it was a conservative practice – you referenced decisions that have been taken. Why is the number so small?
Because it corresponds to a political commitment.
The story that we want to tell is that this is doable – that’s the banner we want to carry.
No comments:
Post a Comment